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Hayden White’s Philosophical History
Ian Hunter
I
In launching his intervention into the philosophy of history in the 1970s, Hayden White began by declaring that the lack of an “un-ambiguous” historical record requires the metahistorian to recover 
the prefigurative “tropes” or structures that are the condition of this 
record assuming the form of a meaningful object of historical knowledge:
Historical accounts purport to be verbal models, or icons, of specific segments 
of the historical process. But such models are needed because the documentary 
record does not figure forth an unambiguous image of the structure of events 
attested in them. In order to figure “what really happened” in the past, therefore, 
the historian must first prefigure as a possible object of knowledge the whole set 
of events reported in the documents. . . . In the poetic act which precedes the 
formal analysis of the field, the historian both creates his object of analysis and 
predetermines the modality of the conceptual strategies he will use to explain it.1
There is, of course, no doubting that we post-Kantians can treat the 
ambiguous or uncertain character of the historical record as an oppor-
tunity to seek its coherence in prefigurative or transcendental cognitive 
structures. Even so, why would you want to? After all, since the four-
teenth century humanist philologists and historians have been raising 
all kinds of doubts about the historical record—regarding conflicting 
sources, corrupt texts, misattributed contexts—and addressing them 
with critical principles, but apparently feeling no need to resolve them 
by turning to transcendental structures.2 According to White, though, 
going transcendental or “formalist” is not a matter of choice, because 
it is the hidden presence of prefigurative cognitive structures or tropes 
that allows the raw “events” of the historical record to assume the form 
of an object of knowledge in the first place. Were we to choose not to 
recover these structures, then we would be acting like the nineteenth-
century historical “realists”—Michelet, Tocqueville, and Ranke—who 
mistook their own prefigurations for historical facts (M 40).
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But this response seems tailored to make the choice to go transcen-
dental seem necessary or inevitable. If the form and level of doubt about 
the historical record is such that it can only be resolved by searching 
for its deep prefigurative conditions, then of course we have no choice 
but to search for them, for not to do so would be to remain ignorant of 
how we already imbue the record with coherence and meaning.3 Why, 
though, should we subject the historical record to this particular form 
and level of doubt—that is, the form that requires us to seek transcen-
dental cognitive conditions in order to allay it? Again, the doubts of 
the humanist historians were not of this kind, yet they were anything 
but naïve realists. I am suggesting, then, that one cannot remove the 
voluntarist dimension of White’s pursuit of metahistorical deep struc-
tures by claiming that this pursuit is necessary to resolve doubt about 
the historical record, because whether and how one comes to doubt the 
historical record might also contain an element of will and decision.
This is the issue that is raised in the antiskeptical dimension of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and that can be summarized in 
the aphorism that “Doubt has its conditions too.” One of the central 
contentions of Wittgenstein’s antiskepticism is that we have become 
accustomed to insisting that knowledge has conditions without paying 
sufficient attention to the fact that doubt does too. This issue becomes 
acute when, as in the case of White’s metahistory, a particular exercise 
of doubt is required in order to pose the question of the transcendental 
conditions of knowledge. Wittgenstein’s decisive intervention here was to 
insist that doubt is internal to particular “language games.” This means 
that whether and how one doubts is not dependent on the nature of 
consciousness or experience, but on whether one is prepared to engage 
in those particular customary activities (or “games”) that give doubt its 
point, or fail to:
342. So how then does doubt get expressed? For me: in a language-game, 
and not merely in certain ways of speaking. Perhaps in looking more closely, 
thus in a quite complicated activity. But this expression of doubt by no means 
always has a sense or purpose.
One simply forgets that doubting too belongs to a language-game.4
This is why doubting can be a matter of will and decision: “What I need 
to show is that a doubt is not necessary even when it is possible.”5 This ap-
plies in particular to what Wittgenstein calls “philosophical doubt,” which 
is the species of doubt internal to the language games of philosophers, 
and which might have no purpose beyond their particular way of life.
Following Wittgenstein, then, we might say that rather than the chaotic 
or indeterminate character of experience leading to doubt, it is the ex-
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ercise of a certain practice of doubt that leads experience to be treated 
as chaotic or indeterminate. The reason that the doubts of the humanist 
historians and philologists did not lead to a search for transcendental 
conditions while White’s do is that the practice of transcendental doubt 
driving White’s search did not emerge until the late eighteenth century. 
I will argue that White’s practice of transcendental doubt first emerged 
in the context of Kantian metaphysics, specifically in the form of Kant’s 
problematization of the intelligibility of the “manifold of perception.” 
Until the 1780s there was no doubt exercise or language game that 
could trigger the search for transcendental conditions, and no form 
of academic-philosophical life in which it could be integrated in the 
grooming of philosophers and philosophical historians, although there 
were of course many other forms of doubt—Pyrrhonistic, neo-Platonic, 
Cartesian—serving a variety of spiritual, ethical, and epistemological 
purposes.
We can now return to the question that we first posed with regard to 
the undertaking of White’s exercise in transcendental doubt and reflec-
tion—But why would you want to?—and draw out the two interlaced lines 
of inquiry that flow from its voluntaristic challenge. In the first place we 
can treat this as a question in the history of philosophy and the history 
of historiography: What were the intellectual-historical conditions or 
contexts that first made it possible for a certain kind of intellectual—
the philosophical historian—to feel compelled to seek transcendental 
conditions for historical knowledge? More specifically, to what extent 
is White’s search for the transcendental tropology of history internal to 
the history of Kantianism as a particular way of academic life? Secondly, 
we can also treat this as a question about the existential choice of a par-
ticular way of academic life that arises at the interstices of history and 
philosophy: Why would you want to choose a form of doubt that sends 
you in pursuit of history’s tropological deep structures when nothing 
about the nature of historical knowledge itself requires you to do so? 
This is a question prompting investigation of the motivational sources 
of certain acts of intellectual self-problematization and self-cultivation. 
In asking these questions, we are of course proposing to submit White’s 
practice of history to a contextual historical investigation and descrip-
tion, treating it as an object for a certain kind of history of philosophy 
and history of historiography. In doing so, we will be claiming to provide 
an empirically true contextual account of White’s philosophical history, 
which is to say an account that could be shown to be false in various 
regards and hence superseded by a better empirical account. Needless 
to say, there will be many who will declare this to be a fundamentally 
flawed strategy that is doomed from the outset. Surely any contextual 
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history of the discourse of transcendental prefiguration must itself be 
transcendentally prefigured, turning its claim to empirical truthfulness 
into a symptom of its failure to grasp its own transcendental conditions.6 
This kind of objection must be forcefully rejected, however, in part be-
cause it seeks to preempt the proposed investigation on purely a priori 
and potentially sectarian grounds—by declaring that contextual inquiry 
must itself be transcendentally prefigured—and in part because those 
who make it are themselves philosophical historians seeking to protect 
their discipline from historicization. After all, the object of the proposed 
investigation into White’s philosophical history is whether contextualist 
historical description must be treated as transcendentally prefigured, 
or whether treating it in this way is a voluntaristic philosophical exercise 
open to contextualist historical description.
The point of mobilizing Wittgenstein’s account of doubt as a practice 
taking place within a language game was to open a space in which tran-
scendental doubt—thence the pursuit of transcendental conditions of 
historical knowledge—can be investigated as a willed intellectual exercise, 
hence as the object of an historical account of the performance of that 
exercise. That is the space—previously characterized as the “history of 
theory”—that we will now proceed to occupy: first by investigating how 
White motivates the pursuit of transcendental structures, then by de-
scribing the Kantian subculture that permitted White to undertake this 
pursuit, and finally by discussing the “psychagogical” and cultural-political 
context of Whitean philosophical history in the American academy.
II
In order to investigate how White motivates and justifies the pursuit 
of transcendental structures, we need to begin with an outline of the 
path that he charts from the chaotic surface of historical experience and 
representation to its structuring transcendental depths. White crosses the 
Rubicon into the land of philosophical history through his declaration 
that “the historian confronts a veritable chaos of events” from which he 
“makes his story by including some events and excluding others” (M 6). 
According to White, the historian does this by (unconsciously) selecting 
from four formal “modes of emplotment”—“Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, 
and Satire”—which are not determined by the chaotic “data” that they 
narrativize, and which produce the appearance of explanations as a sur-
face “affect” or feeling (M x, 7–11). The modes of emplotment are in turn 
coordinated with four forms of “discursive argumentation”—“Formism, 
Organicism, Mechanism, and Contextualism”—which also produce 
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“explanatory affects,” here at the level of argumentational structure, for 
example, the positing of causal laws (Mechanism) or teleological goals 
(Organicism) (M 11–21).7 But these quadruplex forms of emplotment 
and argumentation are themselves supposed to be determined by an 
even deeper level that White calls “poetic and prefigurative.” The four 
“linguistic modes” of this level—“Metaphor, Synecdoche, Metonymy, and 
Irony”—are understood as “modes of consciousness” that constitute the 
foundational “formalist” or transcendental structures of “historical con-
sciousness.” They order the historical “field of perception” and thus form 
the “deep structures of the historical imagination” (M xi, 30–31). Since 
the explanatory emplotments and arguments are underdetermined by 
the historical data or evidence, and shaped by the prefigurative poetic 
structures of the historical imagination, this means that choices among 
historical explanations are not determined “epistemologically” but are 
“moral and aesthetic,” hence lacking in objective justification (M xii, 26).
Clearly White regards this passage from the surface of historical ex-
perience and representation to its prefigurative depths as something 
more than a voluntary philosophical exercise. On the one hand, he 
regards it as necessitated by the “psychology” or epistemology of human 
experience itself—by the need to recover the transcendental structures 
that bring order to its otherwise “chaotic” phenomena. But White of-
fers no justification for adopting this transcendental psychology, and we 
have drawn on Wittgenstein in order to suspend its normative claims 
by treating it as the architecture of a voluntary intellectual exercise. 
On the other hand, in keeping with his claim to be providing not just 
a philosophy of history but also a “history of historical consciousness in 
nineteenth-century Europe” (M 1), White also argues that the pursuit of 
transcendental structures has historical origins: namely, in an unfolding 
“crisis” in historical consciousness that began in early modernity and 
issued in nineteenth-century realism. Despite the nineteenth-century 
focus of Metahistory, White’s account of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century “crisis” in the book’s first chapter forms the threshold through 
which we enter his historiographic world, and thus requires a more 
careful and sustained investigation than it usually receives.
According to White, the Enlightenment historians of the eighteenth 
century were confronted by a radically divided historical field that had 
been bequeathed to them by their seventeenth-century predecessors. 
One pole of this field was occupied by “Ecclesiastical history and Ethno-
graphic history,” whose central characteristic was sectarian schism and 
division. Driven by confessional and racial passions, White’s ecclesiasti-
cal and ethnographic historians were incapable of producing a unified 
historical field and gave rise instead to a “chaos” of opposed histories 
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riven by parti pris and incapable of detached truth (M 59–60). The 
second pole of the seventeenth-century field was formed by “historical 
philology” and its “erudite antiquarians.” Reacting to the schismatic 
ecclesiastical historians in particular, the philological historians sought to 
dampen rivalrous passions and establish historical continuity but, White 
claims, could do so only at the level of “temporal seriality as a mode of 
representation,” hence in the form of the “chronicle” which is not yet 
“true” history. Displaying the fundamentally dialectical character of his 
philosophical history of historiography, White argues that the historiens 
galants of eighteenth-century France were unable to transcend the op-
position between the passionate divisions of ecclesiastical history and 
the cold and merely temporal unity and truth supplied by the erudite 
philologists, which meant that their histories never rose above the level 
of “stories” geared to rhetorical effects and moral lessons.
The “Enlightenment historians” of the eighteenth century—“Voltaire, 
Gibbon, Hume, Kant, and Robertson”—were thus confronted by this 
same “crisis” or unresolved dialectical opposition, which, finally, they 
too could not overcome. This was not due to any aestheticist dalliance 
with moralizing stories, but for a quite different reason: namely, their 
“rationalist” adherence to a sharp division between the rational and the 
irrational, reason and imagination, which was in turn caused by their 
lack of an adequately dialectical “psychological theory”: “The philosophes 
needed a theory of human consciousness in which reason was not set 
over against imagination as the basis of truth against the basis of error, 
but in which the continuity between reason and fantasy was recognized 
. . . and the process in which fantasy or imagination contributed as 
much to the discovery of truth as did reason itself might be perceived” 
(M 51). Lacking this reconciliatory theory of human consciousness, 
the “Enlighteners” thus remained transfixed by the gap between the 
rational and the irrational, idealized imagination and sensory truth, with 
the result that Enlightenment history was written in the Ironic register 
using satirical plot forms (M 54–55).
Bringing to bear the full force of his philosophical-historiographic 
machinery, White argues that, owing to its lack of a dialectical theory 
of human consciousness, Enlightenment historiography was figured 
by Metonymy (“division and opposition”) rather than by Synecdoche 
(“continuity and interchange”), and that it deployed Mechanical forms 
of argumentation based on causal laws rather than Organicist ones based 
on unifying teleologies. Kant is put through the same mill, with White 
arguing that his mode of reflective consciousness was also hamstrung by 
a metonymic failure to reconcile the rational and the irrational and—
somewhat surprisingly—that his histories were grounded in a divisive 
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Mechanical causality rather than a unifying Organicist teleology of the 
kind that White ascribes to Leibniz (M 57–58). So, in the end, Kant too 
remained incapable of reconciling reason and imagination, sensory truth 
and idealistic fantasy, falling back into a Mechanical and Ironic mode 
of history. According to White, this paved the way to a more properly 
reconciliatory approach—“Metaphorical-Synecdochic”—in the Organi-
cist philosophical history of Herder and then Hegel. At the same time, 
it also led to the “realism” of the nineteenth-century historians, who 
reacted to the Enlighteners’ Ironic failure to reconcile fiction and fact 
by opting one-sidedly for the latter, thereby opening up a new chapter 
of dialectical history (M 79–80, 140–43).
Without attempting to capture all of the ensuing modifications to 
White’s basic account, we can observe that in later essays he gave greater 
emphasis to the aesthetic and rhetorical dimension of the transcenden-
tal structures. In an influential essay from the mid-1980s, designed to 
ward of charges of relativism and defend his own version of historical 
“realism,” White continued to argue that the “realist” discipline of 
nineteenth-century historiography was propelled into existence by the 
“chaos” of its seventeenth- and eighteenth-century precursors.8 Here, 
though, he treats the latter as “amateurs” who conceived of the archive 
only as a “repository of tradition, moral exemplars, and admonitory les-
sons,” to be mined for confessionally and politically opposed rhetorical 
histories (64–65). According to White, a disciplined empirical histori-
ography emerged in the nineteenth century as an attempt to order this 
rhetorical chaos through a “de-rhetoricization of historical thinking” 
designed to distinguish objective history from novelistic fictions. Since 
he is precommitted to the view that all historical representation is the 
surface effect of transcendental rhetorical tropes, White can only re-
gard this empirical historiography as symptomatic of the hegemony of 
another rhetorical and aesthetic regime—the “deliberative mode of the 
middle style.” This he associates with the “beautiful,” understood as an 
attempt to domesticate chaotic and unsettling historical events within 
the “common sense” of the existing cultural and political order (65–66). 
Drawing on the traditional Kantian pairing, White then contrasts this 
beautiful empiricism with a “sublime” style that glimpses history before 
its rhetorical domestication—seeing there its supposedly real “terror” 
and “meaninglessness”—and thereby opening a space for a so-called 
“visionary politics” capable of confronting a sublime reality (71–72).
There can be no doubting the remarkable intricacy of White’s histo-
riographic machinery, and the precision with which it divides opposed 
historical styles and projects their future supersession. This very precision 
raises the suspicion, though, that White’s history of historiography might 
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be insufficiently attuned to the contextual variety of historical writing 
and too committed to its future dialectical unity: that it might see too 
far and too little. In fact, White marshals whole epochs of historical 
writing in such a schematic manner—the radically divided character of 
seventeenth-century historiographies, followed by the failed reconcilia-
tion of the eighteenth-century Metonymic-Mechanical Ironists, pointing 
towards the Metaphorical-Synecdochic Organicists and naïve realists of 
the early nineteenth century—that we might suspect that his historical 
justification for pursuing transcendental structures is only a disguised 
version of the philosophical exercise. Nonetheless, we must begin by 
accepting White’s claim to be offering a history of historical conscious-
ness in order to note some evident differences between his schematism 
and other histories of historiography that cover a similar terrain, even 
if in the end we do not hold that claim against him.
Here there are three main issues to take note of, in summary pre-
sentation. First, it is difficult to see how White’s dialectical account of 
seventeenth-century historiography—divided between a passionately 
confessionally fractured ecclesiastical history, and a detached and merely 
chronologically unified historical philology—can be sustained in the 
face of an array of contraindicating studies in the histories of these his-
toriographies. On the one hand, recent studies of seventeenth-century 
ecclesiastical histories have indeed confirmed their confessionally divided 
character. Yet they have simultaneously shown that rather than being an 
impediment to technically sophisticated historical scholarship, confes-
sional division typically intensified such scholarship. This is because the 
drive to defend particular theologies and ecclesiologies led deep into 
the domains of patristics, biblical criticism, and ecclesiastical history 
where ecclesiastical historians drew on the full apparatus of humanistic 
scholarship.9 On the other hand, the patient erudition of the historical 
philologists did not issue in a scholarship so detached as to remove it 
from the critical questions of “true history” and place it on the dusty shelf 
of antiquarian chronicling.10 Here the salient point is that there simply 
was no sharp division between the methods, objectives, problems, and 
personnel of the two forms of historical scholarship, even if their objects 
of inquiry differed in topic and scope.11 Ecclesiastical historians such as 
Gottfried Arnold, Johann Lorenz von Mosheim, and Isaac de Beausobre 
thus availed themselves of the latest philological inquiries—into such 
matters as the authorship of the Old and New Testaments, the impact of 
Greek and gnostic philosophies on early Christianity, and the authenticity 
of confessionally fraught texts—in relation to which the rival (Catholic 
and Protestant) biblical criticism of Richard Simon and Jean Le Clerc 
played a kind of brokering role.12 For their part, the erudite philologists 
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could not resolve technical questions regarding the meaning of terms 
and the authenticity of texts without wide-ranging and deep historical 
knowledge—such as the knowledge of fifth-century Alexandrian neo-
Platonism that Lorenzo Valla needed to establish the apocryphal status 
of the putatively apostolic writer “Dionysius the Areopagite”—and this 
knowledge was frequently used for confessional purposes, as was the 
case with Valla’s unmasking of the Pseudo-Dionysius.13 
Second, if seventeenth-century historiography was thus not character-
ized by a dialectical opposition between its confessional and factual forms, 
then the pursuit of historiographic disinterestedness did not first emerge 
in a nineteenth-century realist historiography seeking to deal with the 
unresolved chaos of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century “rhetorical” his-
tory—whether by appealing to an incontestable factity or by imposing a 
“common sense” aesthetic hegemony. Rather, this pursuit emerged from 
the heart of seventeenth-century ecclesiastical history itself, but not in 
the form of the reified claim to objective knowledge that White identifies 
with historical “realism.” In fact the pursuit of disinterested historical 
scholarship first appeared in confessionally fractured ecclesiastical his-
tory in a quite other form: namely, in the cultivation of “impartiality” as 
a particular kind of scholarly ethos or “stance.” Perhaps the most well-
known attempt in this regard was Arnold’s monumental Unparteyische 
Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie (Impartial History of the Church and Heresy) of 
1699.14 Here the crucial thing to observe is that in contradistinction to 
epistemological critiques of nineteenth-century “realism,” early modern 
impartiality was not an ideology grounded in a delusive belief in the 
objectivity of historical knowledge. Rather, it was understood as a fallible 
ethos or mode of intellectual conduct, cultivated through diverse ethical 
and technical precepts—to identify one’s own confessional bias, restrain 
one’s religious passions as far as possible, cultivate doctrinal indifference, 
consult the best available sources, adhere to the canons of textual criti-
cism—that acknowledged the impossibility of objectively true historical 
knowledge.15 Impartiality emerged not from the delusive misrecognition 
of transcendental structures, but from the inevitably flawed cultivation 
of a way of scholarly life.
Thirdly, if, as it begins to seem, seventeenth-century historiography 
was not characterized by an exemplary opposition between a passion-
ately unhistorical ecclesiastical history and a dispassionately erudite 
philology, then it might also seem implausible to attempt to constitute 
an entire epoch of Enlightenment historiography—“Voltaire, Gibbon, 
Hume, Kant, and Robertson”—in terms of its failure to reconcile such 
an opposition. Rather, if we recall the deep-seated and volatile interac-
tion of confessional cultural politics and technical historical scholarship 
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within these seventeenth-century historiographies, then it seems much 
more likely that their reception by eighteenth-century historians would 
have no general form, and might vary widely and unpredictably in ac-
cordance with the ongoing volatility of that interaction as it played out 
in particular contexts.
Gibbon’s relation to the ecclesiastical historians, for example, was not 
determined by his alleged failure to overcome the putative opposition 
between their confessional passions and the erudite detachment of the 
philologists. Rather it was characterized by the much more straightfor-
ward fact that he drew on them heavily (if not uncritically), especially 
in the writing of chapters 15 and 16 of the Decline and Fall. As we learn 
from John Pocock’s remarkable study of Gibbon, the context for this 
reception was not Enlightenment rationalism but a milieu that Pocock 
calls the “Protestant Enlightenment.” Pocock uses this phrase to charac-
terize a historiographic culture—to which Arnold, Le Clerc, Beausobre, 
and Mosheim all belonged—that sought to reduce Christian teaching 
to the simple message of Christ’s saving love, and to write the history 
of the church in terms of its deviation from this message. At the same 
time, even as it championed a view of the church as a purely human 
association—the distinguishing viewpoint of ecclesiastical history—this 
culture also insisted that understanding the church depended on 
extraordinarily profound and deeply contested theological doctrines 
regarding the nature of Christ and his earthly incarnation, as these had 
played a key role in configuring the church.16 In other words, we might 
say that it was not Gibbon’s lack of an adequately dialectical psychology 
or “theory of human consciousness” that determined his reception of 
the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century ecclesiastical historians, but an 
historical circumstance of a quite different kind: namely, the movement 
of his thought within the same “Protestant Enlightenment” culture as 
theirs, in which the historical understanding of the church would remain 
imbued by deeply embedded and inescapably conflictual theological 
doctrines, even for those who wished to escape their pull.
As with Gibbon, so too Kant’s relation to the ecclesiastical historians 
cannot be understood in terms of his failure to overcome a putative 
dialectical split between their confessional tracts and the dry chronolo-
gies of the philologists, although Kant’s relation to the ecclesiastical 
historians had nothing in common with Gibbon’s. If Gibbon’s work 
was marked by his deep immersion in the ecclesiastical historians and 
biblical critics, then Kant’s was characterized by the absence of any 
reception of these traditions at all, and by his larger hostility towards 
empirical historiography. Formed in the specific milieu of Protestant 
university metaphysics, Kant’s relation to ecclesiastical history was not 
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characterized by the strategy of Pocock’s “Protestant Enlightenment”—
reducing Christianity to the message of Christ’s love acceded to via 
faith, and then historicizing the church through its deviation from that 
message—but by a fundamentally different conception of Protestantism 
and enlightenment.17 For Kant, the true message of Christianity was a 
philosophy of moral self-governance embedded in the scriptures and 
known through reason, while history was the progressive transformation 
of confessional Christianity into this moral philosophy. In his Religion 
within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant treats the biblical message as the 
crude “empirical” and “historical” form in which a saving philosophy 
had been addressed to humanity in its infancy—the philosophy of man’s 
capacity to redeem his own fallen nature through his inner capacity for 
moral self-governance—such that the progressive refinement of biblical 
Christianity into self-redeeming moral philosophy is itself the motor 
and destiny of history.18 This marked the birth of both philosophical 
hermeneutics and philosophical history, in whose footsteps White’s 
metahistory would eventually tread.
We began our discussion by treating White’s appeal to the “chaos” 
of the historical field as a tactic within a Kantian language game of 
transcendental doubt and reflection, and we drew on Wittgenstein’s 
antiskeptical philosophy to excuse ourselves from playing along. Now we 
have reason to conclude that White’s delineation of a “crisis” in historical 
consciousness, brought about by its supposed insufficiently dialectical 
character, should also be regarded as grounded in a particular kind 
of philosophical exercise, since White’s dialectical diagnosis appears 
to have no basis in the history of historiography, and yet functions as 
a means of inducing the pursuit of transcendental structures. I would 
now suggest that we do greater justice to White’s philosophical history 
if we discount his claims to be engaging in the history of historiography 
and treat his discourse as a particular practice of philosophy that takes 
historiography as its field of operation.
If White’s account of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century historiogra-
phies bears little resemblance to those that we find in specialist histories 
of historiography, that is because his divided and chaotic “premodern” 
historical field is not an object of investigation and description. Rather, it 
is an intellectual condition that is invoked as the trigger for a particular 
kind of intellectual performance: the suspension of empirical attention 
to documents and contexts, and the reorientation of attention “inwards,” 
onto the transcendental figura that are supposed to lie in the practitio-
ner’s own “mind” as the forms of “historical consciousness.” Approached 
thus, as a concrete intellectual activity or “game,” White’s transcendental 
philosophical history can neither be false nor true. It would thus be no 
new literary history342
less misguided for us to attempt to criticize this philosophical history 
for its falsity than to defend it for its truth. We can, though, offer an 
empirical description of it as a particular kind of intellectual activity, 
and this description is capable of being true, which is to say, capable of 
being shown to be false.
If it is not the nature of historical cognition, then, that motivates the 
pursuit of transcendental foundations, how did this pursuit emerge as 
a voluntary or institutional intellectual practice? In asking this question 
we move to our second object of enquiry: an account of the Kantian 
subculture that permitted White to engage in this pursuit. 
III
Looking back on his Metahistory in 1978, White could declare: “I will 
not apologize for this Kantian element in my thought, but I do not think 
that modern psychology, anthropology, or philosophy has improved 
upon it.”19 Since then, the presence of Kantian and neo-Kantian figures 
of thought in White’s philosophy of history has become the subject of 
increasing attention.20 This is so even amongst his closest followers where, 
for example, we find White’s four prefigurative tropes treated as the 
philosophical-historical analogue of Kant’s four kinds of transcendental 
category.21 For the most part, however, these studies approach White’s 
reception of Kantianism in terms of the transmission of fundamental 
philosophical propositions or ideas, which presents certain limitations 
for our present concerns.
First, such an approach tends to assume that Kant’s philosophy is 
normatively true or historically foundational, hence that the pursuit 
of transcendental structures is indeed an intrinsic feature of human 
consciousness rather than a particular kind of intellectual practice. This 
would preclude us from investigating White’s own pursuit of transcenden-
tal structures in terms of his historical reception of a Kantian intellectual 
subculture. Second, in viewing it in terms of the direct transmission of 
Kant’s “ideas” or propositions, this approach overlooks the degree to 
which White’s Kantianism belongs to a distinctively American reception 
of Kant, one whose roots lay in nineteenth-century “liberal” Protestant-
ism, mediated in part by the philosophical movement of American 
pragmatism. As a result, the “propositional” approach pays insufficient 
attention to what White’s Kantianism actually consists of—which, we will 
argue, lies less in particular philosophical doctrines than in the adoption 
of a broadly Kantian ethos and cultural politics. 
With regards to the first of these concerns—the redescription of 
the Kantian pursuit of transcendental structures as the product of a 
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particular intellectual subculture rather than as a feature of human 
consciousness—clearly we can only offer a brief outline suited to our 
present purposes. Here the crucial thing to observe is that the practice 
of transcendental doubt and reflection that White treats as a “theory 
of human consciousness” first emerged in Protestant Germany in the 
1780s, where it formed part of Kant’s remarkable retooling of Protestant 
university metaphysics.22 Seen historically, Kant’s achievement was to take 
over the fundamental architecture of this metaphysics—the conception 
of God as a noumenal intellect generating the pure (a priori) forms of 
things, and man as the sensory intelligence to whom these forms appear 
as empirical experience—but then to internalize and subjectivize it by 
treating it as the architecture of human subjectivity. From this historical 
adaptation arose Kant’s double-sided conception of the human subject, 
consisting of a spontaneous intellect capable of generating the pure 
forms of experience and morality, and a passive sensibility in which 
these forms are registered as spatiotemporal appearances and sensuously 
distracted moral commands.23 
This duplex metaphysical anthropology in turn supplies the architec-
ture for the Kantian practice of transcendental doubt and reflection. 
If space and time are the forms of human sensing rather than objects 
of sense perception, then sensory perception by itself cannot supply 
recognizable objects of experience or knowledge. Instead, it can only 
deliver a chaotic “manifold [multiplicity] of perception,” which means 
that we must seek the synthesizing conditions of empirical experience at 
the level of transcendental forms of perception and thought.24 For Kant 
of course to regard the perceptual field as a “rhapsodic” multiplicity was 
not a matter of choice, since he was precommitted to the anthropology 
of man as a mind wedded to a sensibility whose passivity means that it 
requires transcendental shaping or “selection.” Equally clearly, though, 
for someone who is unaware of this metaphysical anthropology or is 
committed to another kind—Thomist, Stoic, Epicurean, and so on—
there is no need to treat the perceptual field as chaotic, since Kantian 
anthropology itself supplies the rules of the “language game” or form 
of life within which this kind of transcendental doubt makes sense and 
outside which it does not.25 Transcendental doubt is thus not an object 
of Kantian philosophy but an existential act that is the condition of 
engaging in it as a practice.
For those who moved within its orbit, the Kantian academic subculture 
had striking consequences for the understanding of history and the 
practice of historiography. As a discipline whose object was comprised 
of recorded temporal events, empirical historiography, when seen from 
the Kantian perspective, had to be understood as a knowledge that 
had not yet recovered its own transcendental conditions, giving rise to 
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the founding premise of the Kantian philosophy of history. When seen 
from the same Kantian standpoint, history itself had to be understood 
as the unfolding of transcendental or moral imperatives in the domain 
of (otherwise) chaotic historical appearances—an understanding some-
times confusingly called “historicism”—this constituting the founding 
premise of philosophical history.26 Given their conditions of historical 
emergence—as extrapolations from a particular subcultural metaphysi-
cal anthropology and teleology—Kantian-Hegelian philosophy of history 
and philosophical history thus should not be understood as theorizations 
of empirical historiography, as they are by White (M 141–43). Rather, 
they should be viewed as the weapons of a rival disciplinary subculture 
dedicated to combatting empirical historiography and subordinating 
it to a specifically philosophical or theological cultural politics. If, as 
we have argued, only those who have first been initiated into Kantian 
transcendental doubt feel the need or have the ability to treat empirical 
history as a domain of underdetermined appearances—as inherently 
rhapsodic, ambiguous, or chaotic—then their claim to have discovered 
its transcendental structures can only be regarded as a combat strategy 
or cultural politics for subordinating empirical historiography to a rival 
intellectual subculture.
The history of German Protestant academic philosophy from Leibniz 
through Wolff to Kant and Hegel can be understood in part as a sustained 
attempt to subordinate empirical historiography to metaphysics in order 
to prevent the latter’s historicization.27 The German metaphysicians 
sought to revivify various conceptions of the world as a manifestation 
of transcendental intellection, but now transposing this theistic archi-
tecture to the interior of a double-sided human subject—as we saw in 
the case of Kant’s duplex anthropology—from which a philosophical 
history could be projected as the dialectical unfolding of man’s two 
sides. The objective of this cultural politics was to reinstate a concep-
tion of a “creative” or constructive mind at the center of cosmos and 
culture, thereby transmuting theist into “humanist” metaphysics. This 
made it possible to insist that the empirical sciences and their objects 
must have metaphysical foundations; that empirical history is actually 
the temporal unfolding or becoming of man’s transcendental rational-
ity; and that the plurality of confessional religions would eventually be 
replaced by a rational religion—Kant’s “pure religion of reason”—in 
the course of this transcendental-historical unfolding.28 These were the 
central elements of the Kantian ethos or intellectual comportment, and 
they would prove highly durable and adaptive in providing theological 
and philosophical elites with a cultural politics aimed at forestalling 
the autarky of the positive sciences, sidetracking the historicization of 
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theology and philosophy, and subordinating confessional ecclesiastical 
religions to a “liberal” moral theology or philosophy that was supposed 
to be their historical destiny.
If this is enough to indicate that White’s philosophical history was 
heir to a Kantian philosophical subculture and cultural politics—rather 
than to a Kantian “theory of consciousness”—then we can move on 
to our second concern: to show that White’s Kantianism belongs to a 
specifically American reception of the Kantian subculture, one that had 
begun in nineteenth-century “liberal” Protestantism and was continued 
in American idealism and pragmatism. The first and crucial reception of 
Kantian and Hegelian philosophies in America took place in the Protes-
tant seminaries and colleges of the Northeast, apart from the Midwest 
outpost of St. Louis Hegelianism.29 Initially, this reception was shaped by 
a specific theological conflict. This was between a Calvinist theology of 
revelation, faith, and predestined redemption (or damnation) that was 
grounded in the doctrine of man’s incapacitation by sin, and a variety of 
forms of “liberal” Protestant rationalism teaching man’s capacity to know 
the divine will through his own reason, and perhaps even to redeem 
himself through this same capacity.30 Kantianism and Hegelianism pro-
vided liberal Protestantism with an alternative anthropology according 
to which, through the dialectical reconciliation of man’s intellectual and 
sensuous sides, it was possible to envisage his progressive moral regen-
eration into a “higher self.”31 This would supposedly occur through the 
intellectualist emancipation of thought from empirical facts, and will 
from sensuous inclinations. In this way German Protestant rationalism 
provided its American cousin with a double-edged sword useful against 
both “atheist” empiricism and Calvinist fideism.
Owing to its metaphysical underpinnings, Kant’s duplex anthropology 
was no more “rational” than the “pessimistic” Calvinist anthropology 
of man’s sin-damaged nature, especially if we take Jonathan Edwards’s 
highly rationalist version of the latter as our point of comparison. But 
the East-coast reception of Kant did provide liberal Protestantism with a 
powerful cultural-political program based in the idealist core of the Kan-
tian and Hegelian philosophies: namely, that man shaped the world he 
inhabited through creative intellection, and was capable of transforming 
himself into its moral governor by realizing his inner capacity for ratio-
nal self-governance. In this way the American Protestant philosophical 
theologians not only took over Kant’s and Hegel’s rationalist attack on 
confessional religion—their (finally delusive) doctrine that history was 
itself transforming revealed religion into rational moral philosophy—but 
also the other main planks of rationalist cultural politics: the notion that 
the empirical sciences could not be atheistically autonomous, since they 
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too were grounded in a “constructive” intellect, and that theology and 
philosophy could not themselves be fully historicized, since history was 
itself the dialectical unfolding of transcendental reason. This last plank 
was of course the core doctrine of philosophical history and holds the 
key to its American emergence.
The fact that theological and philosophical anthropologies were not 
different in kind, and that the latter had emerged from the former—
through Kant’s subjectivist interiorization of the architecture of divine 
and human being—not only meant that the philosophical reception of 
Kantianism and Hegelianism could serve theological purposes; it also 
meant that theological and metaphysical doctrines could assume a ratio-
nal humanist form in expositions of these philosophies. From the 1840s 
onwards the key nexus in this regard was that formed between philo-
sophical theology and rational psychology. From their putative common 
foundation in the “creative human mind,” there emerged a philosophical 
theology that taught man’s capacity for rational moral regeneration, and 
a rational psychology in which Kant’s metaphysical distinction between 
the spontaneous intellect and passive sensory intuition could be used in 
quasi-empirical psychological and anthropological accounts of human 
creativity.32 This psychologized Kantianism and Kantianized psychology 
pivoted on the doctrine that sensation remained “chaotic” until it had 
been synthesized by the transcendental structures of the mind, which 
was in turn man’s way of exercising the creative intellect that joined him 
to divine intuition and will, thereby realizing his “higher self.”
This doctrine remained fundamental to American liberal theology and 
academic philosophy right through to the beginning of the twentieth 
century, where we can see it operating at full force in Josiah Royce’s 
Gifford Lectures of 1900, The World and the Individual: The Four Historical 
Conceptions of Being. Here Royce not only located his “theory of being” 
at the nexus of rational psychology and natural theology, but he did so 
by deploying Kant’s duplex philosophical anthropology, insisting on the 
primacy of the mind’s “selective” ideational capacity as the condition of 
empirical knowledge.33 But Royce simultaneously argued that concep-
tualization be understood in terms of the purposes governing it as an 
everyday activity, thereby transposing a Kantianized rational psychology 
and natural theology into a philosophical register that some would 
call pragmatism (19–26).34 In what would become a magic number for 
pragmatist philosophical-psychological taxonomies, Royce insisted that 
there were just four ways in which “being” could be conceptualized: 
mysticism and realism, which represented the pure rationalist and pure 
empiricist options; “critical rationalism,” which was Kant’s Copernican 
reduction of objects to the mind’s ideas of them; and the “fourth” or 
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synthetic conception (345–60). This emerged when Kant’s too-rationalist 
picture of conceptualization was transformed into the pragmatist view of 
the mind shaping the world to fulfill its teleological purposes, thereby 
defeating both rationalism and empiricism: “For in the victorious warfare 
with finitude consists the perfection of the spirit” (382).
We are now in a position to see that the Kantian dimension of White’s 
philosophical history derived not from his direct engagement with Kant’s 
philosophical doctrines—there is little textual evidence of this—but from 
his participation in this specifically American reception of Kant. Here 
it was less the detail of the doctrines that mattered than their role in a 
broadly antiempiricist and moral-rationalist cultural politics. In his earli-
est attack on the historians—in “The Burden of History” in 1966—White 
thus situates them in the same dialectical philosophical space that had 
been charted by the early-twentieth-century idealists and pragmatists, 
arguing that historians were trapped between a “postivistic” scientism 
and a “romantic” aestheticism, leaving them incapable of mediating 
between brute facts and moral judgments.35 No less strikingly familiar 
is White’s appeal to rational psychology as holding the key to the true 
mediation of positivist empiricism and idealist aestheticism: “But modern 
criticism—mostly as a result of advances made by psychologists in the 
investigation of the human synthesizing faculties—has achieved a clearer 
understanding of the operations by which the artist expresses his vision 
of the world and the scientist frames his hypotheses about it.” As a result 
of these fundamental psychological discoveries—White does not say what 
or when they were—the false middle ground occupied by the historians 
has “dissolved in the discovery of the common constructivist character of 
both artistic and scientific statements” (112). Rightly attacked by social 
scientists and philosophers for its scientific backwardness and by literary 
artists for its scientistic repression of values—twin failings constituting 
the “burden of history”—history itself is a symptom of a sick civilization. 
A cure will only be found, White argues, in the latest “constructivist” 
outlook that reveals the “metaphors” through which intellectuals select 
from the raw “data” of history and in doing so imbue it with meaning 
and value: “Thus for [Hegel, Balzac, and Tocqueville] history was less an 
end in itself than a preparation for a more perfect understanding and 
acceptance of the individual’s responsibility in fashioning the common 
humanity of the future” (133).
It is striking, then, that in this early adumbration of White’s program 
we find a recapitulation of idealist-pragmatist cultural politics—a diag-
nosis of the gap between empiricism and idealism as a cultural disease, 
an identification of psychological constructivism as a spiritual curative 
promising moral regeneration—while the Kantian language and tran-
new literary history348
scendental architectonics that would shortly appear in Metahistory are 
almost completely absent. Even more striking, however, is the conduit 
through which these elements made their sudden appearance in the 
latter work. For I would suggest that their key source lies neither (as 
some have argued) in European linguistic structuralism nor in Giambat-
tista Vico’s rhetorical historiography, but in a source much closer to the 
local mix of idealism and pragmatism that informed the earlier essay: 
namely, in the descriptive metaphysics that White found in Stephen C. 
Pepper’s now largely forgotten World Hypotheses of 1942.36
In a manner strikingly reminiscent of Royce’s The World and the Indi-
vidual, Pepper offered a taxonomy of the transcendental structures of 
experience grounded in a rational psychology. He too came up with just 
four of them: Formism, Organicism, Mechanism, and Contextualism.37 
Pepper’s Formism and Mechanism roughly correlate with Royce’s mys-
ticism and realism, while his Organicism structurally parallels Royce’s 
critical rationalism, and his Contextualism matches Royce’s fourth or 
pragmatic theory of being. Less important than term-for-term match-
ing, however, is the fact that Pepper offered an updated version of the 
idealist-pragmatist typology of possible world constructions—grounded 
in a broadly Kantian psychology and functioning as a metaphysical-moral 
schematism for diagnosing and curing the cultural illness of failed me-
diation—for this is what White took from Pepper.
In turning Pepper’s four world hypotheses into a particular level 
of his metahistory—the level of the forms of discursive argumenta-
tion—White was able to achieve several important ends simultaneously 
(see M 13–21). First, in keeping with the program announced in the 
“Burden of History” essay, he was able to shift the entire burden of 
stalled civilizational mediation onto the historians. Their oscillation 
between an unscientific aestheticism and a nihilistic scientism made 
them vicariously responsible for the cultural schism between irrespon-
sible idealism and positivist empiricism. At the same time, in using Pep-
per’s four transcendental hypotheses to provide a schematism for the 
role of “metaphor” in structuring historical representation, White was 
able to present his own philosophical history not just as a metaphysi-
cal diagnosis of failed cultural mediation—as we saw in his account of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century historiography—but also as the 
harbinger of the intellectual curative that would overcome this cultural 
malady. This would come in the form of the “psychology” or “theory 
of consciousness” which showed that both science and art, empiricist 
facts and aesthetic fictions, were in fact reconciled in the transcendental 
structures of the “historical imagination.” Finally, in aligning Pepper’s 
Formism, Organicism, Mechanism, and Contextualism with the four 
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“modes of emplotment”—Romance, Tragedy, Comedy, and Satire—that 
he borrowed from Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism, and then with 
the four “prefigurative tropes”—Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, and 
Irony—that he borrowed from linguistic formalism, White was able to 
supply the machinery for a powerful philosophical hermeneutics. Here 
the recovery of transcendental structures functioned as a form of cul-
tural criticism and cultural prophecy organized around “fashioning the 
common humanity of the future.” 
Perhaps this will be enough to show that White’s transcendental tropol-
ogy was not grounded in the nature of historical consciousness, but in 
the metaphysical anthropology and intellectual regimen of a particular 
philosophical subculture: namely, Kantian philosophical psychology, 
theology, and history, in the distinctive form in which it was received in 
the theology of American Protestant rationalism as a combative cultural 
politics, and then reshaped in the idealist variant of American pragma-
tism. Part of the answer to our question, then, of why someone would 
want to undertake the acts of transcendental doubt and reflection as-
sociated with Whitean metahistory—given that such acts do not reveal 
the “conditions of historical consciousness”—is that they formed part 
of a combative antiempirical philosophical subculture that had arisen 
in Protestant Germany in the 1780s and subsequently been adapted to 
the cultural politics of Protestant America. We have not yet broached 
the question, though, of why certain intellectuals might feel motivated 
to enter this intellectual subculture, although its promises to realize a 
“higher self” and a “future humanity” represent significant clues in this 
regard, which we can now follow up.
IV
To discuss this issue we need to draw on a likely unfamiliar intellectual 
resource: historical studies of “psychagogy”—practices for the schooling 
of the mind—in German, Seelenführung and Seelenleitung, later Bildung, 
all of which refer to notions of spiritual guidance and moral grooming. 
Such studies are rarely found in histories of modern philosophy, but are 
well developed in histories of classical philosophy and early Christian 
metaphysics.38 A central feature of these studies is their inquiry into the 
acts of guided self-problematization—the induced anxieties regarding the 
“chaos” of perceptions, the contradictoriness of beliefs, the uncontrol-
lability of passions, and so on—through which a tiny minority crosses the 
threshold of subjectivity that leads to philosophical reflection. A second 
feature of some of these studies is their focus on a particular nexus: that 
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which psychagogy forms between knowledge of the mind and cosmos 
(“philosophy”), and the self-transformative acts that the protophilosopher 
is required to perform in order to become the kind of person who will 
be vouchsafed such knowledge (“spirituality”).39
Schooling and schools would seem to be the condition of both these 
objects, since in order to engage in philosophical reflection individuals 
must first learn how to be dissatisfied with their existing intellectual 
dispositions—their “chaotic” perceptions, contradictory beliefs, danger-
ous passions. Similarly, imbuing the mind with the moral or intellectual 
purity required to behold its own structures is understood as a kind of 
intellectual grooming or schooling.40 This process requires some kind 
of pedagogical institution in which the texts or tradition containing 
the intellectual architecture—or language game—for this grooming 
are transmitted or modeled by a master through special pedagogical 
routines or rituals. Is it possible that the aspiration or desire for intel-
lectual purity and reflexivity that is induced in those undergoing such 
grooming holds the key to understanding how certain intellectual cadres 
are motivated to engage in transcendental doubt and reflection? More 
specifically, if the exercise of transcendental doubt and reflection in 
Whitean philosophical history cannot be motivated through appeal to 
the chaotic character of empirical history—since this chaos is a projec-
tion of the exercise itself—can this motivation be understood in terms 
of the existence of a certain kind of schooling of the mind, and the 
character of the schools in which this takes place?
In order to at least open up these questions for discussion and further 
research, we can identify three key features of Whitean philosophical his-
tory, now approached as a special kind of intellectual grooming housed 
in a particular sort of school. First, if, as we have argued, White’s acts of 
transcendental doubt and reflection obtain their inner architecture and 
cultural purpose from an Americanized Kantian philosophical subculture, 
we can now suggest that they acquire their compelling character from 
the intellectual purity and reflexivity promised by the acts themselves. If 
White’s assertions regarding the “chaos” of historical perceptions—or the 
“crisis” of a dialectically conflicted historical consciousness—cannot be 
understood as confirmable propositions in the history of historiography, 
we can now suggest that this is because these declarations are aimed 
at transforming the intellectual disposition of those who make them. 
The making of these assertions is perhaps best understood as a kind of 
pedagogical ritual or exercise through which those entering White’s 
variant of the Kantian subculture learn to act on themselves in order 
to suspend their assent to empirical history and historiography. This is 
the condition of their turning their attention “inwards,” which is to say 
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away from work on historical sources and evidence and towards a certain 
“work on the self,” carried out through transcendental-philosophical 
figures of thought. Here, we are dealing with something like a spiritual 
exercise in the “conversion of attention.”
The form of philosophical doubt undertaken through the voluntaristic 
declaration of the historical field’s chaotic or divided character thus may 
be understood as an act of problematization that aspirant philosophi-
cal historians perform on themselves. More specifically, it works as a 
psychagogical device or ritual through which such persons specify what 
it is about themselves that falls short of a certain ideal of intellectual 
life: namely, here, their “realist” or “empiricist” predisposition to accept 
empirical history as already meaningful, prior to the actions of a construc-
tive intellect. This provides the impetus and direction for a particular 
“work of the self on the self” through which would-be philosophical 
historians purge this flawed or “diseased” disposition in order to realize 
a higher self whose purity is reflected in the pure (nonempirical) forms 
of historical consciousness:
In short, to a significant segment of the artistic community the historian appears 
as the carrier of a disease which was at once the motive force and the nemesis 
of nineteenth-century civilization. This is why so much of modern fiction turns 
upon the attempt to liberate Western man from the tyranny of the historical 
consciousness. It tells us that it is only by disenthralling human intelligence from 
the sense of history that men will be able to confront creatively the problems 
of the present. The implications of all this for any historian who values artistic 
vision as anything more than play are obvious: he must ask himself how he can 
participate in this liberating activity and whether his participation entails the 
destruction of history itself.41
In short the act of transcendental doubt that initiates philosophical 
history issues in an intellectual regimen whose aim is not historical 
knowledge, but the cultivation of a higher self that is capable of behold-
ing and participating in a liberating transcendental truth. This imbues 
White’s philosophical history with some of the key characteristics of an 
exercise in spiritual grooming.
The second thing to be observed regarding White’s philosophical 
history is that the ethical work on the self that it demands is carried out 
through a particular kind of hermeneutic work on texts.42 If we make 
an exception for archaeology, then it might be said that all historical 
disciplines involve interpretive work on texts. During the period of the 
structuralist “linguistic turn” in the 1960s and 70s, however, this disciplin-
ary truism was inflated into a philosophical truth. At that point it was 
declared that context too is a kind of text, since context could only be 
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known through texts, which was taken to deprive contextual investigation 
of its role in grounding textual interpretation. Philosophical hermeneu-
tics was thus supposed to go all the way down the chain of interpreta-
tions—contexts were just more texts—at the bottom of which were only 
more interpretations ad infinitum.43 In defending the statement “History 
is a text,” White thus argued that “every approach to the study of the past 
presupposes or entails some version of a textualist theory of historical 
reality,” because the “historical past is, as Fredric Jameson has argued, 
accessible to study ‘only by way of prior (re)textualization.’” Contextual 
description of historical events thus cannot provide an independent 
ground for the explication of texts, since such description is a “product 
of processes of linguistic condensation, displacement, symbolization, and 
secondary revision of the kind that inform the production of texts.”44
It should now be clear enough, though, that despite its psycholinguistic 
aura, “textualization” here is nothing more than a latter-day version of 
the Kantian transcendental structuring of experience. To view all objects 
of knowledge—including context—as mediated by transcendental textual 
structures thus only makes sense within the Kantianized subculture that 
we have been describing. Having already demonstrated the voluntaristic 
character of this subculture, we should have no qualms in turning our 
backs on the textualist problematization of context. This will permit 
us to acknowledge that, since the rise of early-modern humanism and 
historical philology, there have been various forms of historical textual 
analysis that have indeed presumed an access to contextual evidence 
that is not itself transcendentally-textually conditioned, even if it is tex-
tually recorded and transmitted. These forms of empirical contextual 
analysis have included philological criticism aimed at resolving undeci-
phered, corrupt, or interpolated words through knowledge of ancient 
mores and ways of life;45 biblical criticism seeking to explicate sacred 
texts and commentaries in terms of the religious customs and practices 
of particular historical communities;46 histories of theology in which 
theological controversies are discussed in terms of the emergence of 
local religious movements and conflicts between rival ecclesiastical fac-
tions;47 and histories of political thought in which the meaning of texts 
is discussed in terms of the roles or offices of their writers—as court 
humanists, political secretaries, scholarly advisers, jurisconsults—and the 
circumstances of their exercise.48 Closer to our present concerns, from 
the 1930s onwards a powerful contextual analysis of the structures of 
folktales has been available. Here, narrative patterns have been tied not 
to supposedly transcendental structures of linguistic consciousness—in 
the manner of Whitean formalism—but to the habitual imitative for-
mulae required by oral composition and the specialized training of 
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oral bards.49 Let us suggest then that the “linguistic turn” was nothing 
more than a turning away—a “conversion of attention”—from these 
historical-philological forms of contextualism and towards neo-Kantian 
philosophical inwardness.
Our account of White’s philosophical history can be viewed as an 
appendage to this line of empirical contextualism, since it argues that 
the structure and meaning of White’s texts can be understood in terms 
of the Americanized version of the Kantian subculture that he had re-
ceived via the idealist variant of pragmatism. It is in this context that the 
particular philosophical-hermeneutic form of Whitean textual exegesis 
can be understood. As we showed in our discussion of his treatment of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century historiography, the point of White’s 
account of the tropological structure of the texts of empirical historians 
is not to open a corrigible investigation into the historical transmission 
and reception of the tropes, as learned forms of composition suited to 
particular historiographic, cultural, and political circumstances. Rather 
it is to posit them as the transcendental figures required to prefigure 
an otherwise chaotic or meaningless historical field. This permits the 
philosophical historian to reveal their presence beneath the “surface” 
forms of historical texts and, in doing so, to realize the higher self that 
would otherwise remain trapped within an obtuse historiography claim-
ing to be grounded in empirical evidence. And this in turn explains why, 
after some initial head scratching by historians, White’s philosophical 
history found its most significant reception in literary and philosophical 
rather than historical studies.50 In turning away from external evidence 
and towards transcendental structures, and in deploying a hermeneutics 
aimed at the realization of a higher self rather than the philological 
decipherment of texts, White’s philosophical history was not just use-
less for empirical historiography but actually inimical to it. But it was 
precisely this dimension of White’s philosophical history that facilitated 
its reception in literature departments, for they had long deployed an 
inward-looking hermeneutics in which textual exegesis formed part of 
a practice of aesthetic and ethical self-cultivation.51
We have suggested that the motivation to engage in the relevant acts 
of transcendental doubt and reflection hinges on the psychagogically 
induced desire to realize a higher intellectual self and, further, that the 
prime locus for this psychagogy is an exegetical “hermeneutics of the 
self” that is performed on the texts of empirical historians. This further 
suggests—and this is our third and final observation—that access to the 
objects of philosophical-historical reflection is contingent on an institu-
tion that maintains and transmits the means of psychagogical induction 
and grooming: the school. For our present purposes the school can be 
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understood as a hierarchically and ritually ordered nexus of students 
and teachers in which students acquire the desire and the capacity to 
learn through pedagogically instituted relations—of love and discipline, 
emulation and surveillance, affirmation and correction—that join them 
to a teacher who thereby possesses significant charismatic authority. 
Schools are typically institutions within larger religious, civic, or political 
cultures whose pedagogical transmission they secure and whose objec-
tives shape the forms and purposes of schooling. We can now suggest 
that Whitean philosophical history emerged as a schooling of thought 
within a particular kind of American school: namely, in the network of 
liberal arts colleges and graduate schools where the higher humanities 
form the nexus between the mastery of knowledge and moral grooming.52
As we have seen, this network, which remained dominated by the 
culture of liberal Protestantism throughout the nineteenth century, 
provided the context for the reception of Kantian and Hegelian philoso-
phies. This was principally because the psychagogical function of these 
philosophies—their capacity to organize the world of learning around 
the spiritual grooming of a higher transcendental self—allowed them to 
displace the earlier more clerically focused anthropology and pedagogy 
of Calvinism with a regimen suited to the formation of a broader moral 
and civic elite.53 One way of understanding Royce’s The World and the 
Individual and Pepper’s World Hypotheses is as teaching texts suited to 
the moral and civic purposes of American humanities liberal arts col-
leges and graduate schools. Their role was to deploy their respective 
typologies of world constructions as metaphysical schematisms through 
which students could learn to view the cultural cosmos as morally frac-
tured—into its ideal and material, rationalist and empiricist, aestheticist 
and scientistic parts—and thence to project their higher selves as the 
condition of transcendental reconciliation.
Conclusion
Let us conclude, then, that White’s transposition of Pepper’s fourfold 
metaphysical typology into the transcendental architectonics for his 
philosophical history is a sign that Metahistory should also be regarded 
as a teaching text, one that supplied a schematics of spiritual groom-
ing to the upper end of the American humanities academy. Through a 
hermeneutics that permitted them to discern their own moral fractur-
ing in the cultural divisions that had paralyzed the empirical historians, 
White supplied his students and readers with a handbook that allowed 
them to glimpse their own higher selves in the transcendental structures 
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so badly misunderstood by the naïve empiricists. In doing so he helped 
to school a moral elite whose privilege consists in its members’ purely 
charismatic capacity to order the universe of knowledge around their 
own imaginal insight into its supposed transcendental structures, and 
into the dialectical unfolding of these structures in and as history. 
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